For more information: http://www2.bc.edu/~guilleje/Homepage%28Frames%29.html
Date: July 25-27, 2005 (3 days)
Course: 17.60s Tuition: free
Continuing Education Units (CEUs): 2.00
Registration is on Monday morning at 8:30 am. Class runs 9:00 am - 5:00 pm every day except Wednesday when it ends at 4:00 pm.
The threat of bioterrorism poses new challenges for governmental agencies that now have the added responsibility to ensure biosecurity. For a bioterrorist attack is both a public heath emergency, and a criminal act whose perpetrators need to be apprehended. And the terrorists involved may or may not be part of an international network. Thus public health, law enforcement and national security agencies all face new priorities, including learning to collaborate with each other.
Implementing these new priorities will require substantial organizational learning and change. But agencies have deeply embedded professional norms and organizational culture, and they are resistant to change even in times of crisis. Each agency responds with its own routines, and its own distinctive view of "the threat," which dilutes new initiatives and impedes effective collaboration.
The 2001 anthrax letter attacks provide many cases of unresolved organizational issues. The Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) brought its own organizational style to investigating the outbreaks. It focused on the pathways of exposure, establishing an index case, and other public health procedures. The FBI though, faced with the same incident, saw a crime scene that needed to be secured, evidence that needed collection by its procedures, and perpetrators who needed to be identified. But the Bureau agents lacked the relevant scientific background. The military had studied anthrax for decades, but much of its information remains cloaked in secrecy and unavailable to other agencies. Thus, while the need for collaboration is great, the potential for differing organizational styles to produce conflict is high.
How then do we get existing agencies to actually change their priorities concerning bioweapons? How do we get them to understand and make use of alternative approaches brought by other agencies? How do we get them to provide accurate information to the public?
Recent participants in this course have come from the CIA; the Centers for Disease Control; IBM; Argonne National Lab; city, county and state Public Heath Departments from Massachusetts to Oklahoma; the US Army and Air Force; Police and Fire Departments from Illinois, Arizona and Texas; Battelle Institute; and Department of Defense intelligence agencies.
Impediments to Organizational Change: professional norms, organizational routines and culture
Is
reorganization an effective response to these issues? Is the Department
of Homeland Security part of the solution or part of the problem?
Case Study: the Soviet anthrax outbreak
In 1979 a
Soviet biological weapons plant accidentally released a significant
amount of anthrax into the open air, killing over 50 civilians. In the
1990s a team of Western scientists was finally allowed to do a
retrospective study of this release. What can we learn from this
incident about the lethality and persistence of atmospheric anthrax;
its incubations periods and human thresholds?
Case Study: the US postal anthrax outbreaks
The 2001
anthrax letters caught all the federal and state agencies off guard.
What are the lessons for anthrax detection and treatment; for
interagency cooperation; and especially for clear, consistent risk
communication to the public?
Rethinking the Public Health Approach
A classical
CDC investigation includes defining the scope of the epidemic; looking
for environmental sources; and establishing treatment regimens. How
should these activities change when both the virulence of the
biological agent and its spread may have been intentional?
Case Study: the smallpox immunization program
How
can we estimate the risks of an outbreak? How do we model the potential
spread? What should be the risk threshold for policymakers evaluating
immunizations? Who should bear the medical and financial burdens of the
anticipated side effects? Does one public health program divert
resources from other priorities?
Expanding the Law Enforcement Approach
The standard
FBI and other law enforcement approaches stress careful examination of
the crime scene and a search for the perpetrators of the crime. However
law officers were not trained in the identification of biological
agents, nor in the capabilities needed to make or spread bioagents. How
do we expand law enforcement routines to respond to bioterrorism? How
do we organize law enforcement and scientific capabilities to work in
harness?
Biological Weapons and National Security
Why did
governments develop biological weapons? How did their militaries forsee
the benefits and costs of battlefield use? Why were the programs so
secretive? Why did the major powers never make use of biological
weapons? Why the Iraqis did develop them? What is the potential for
transfers of expertise and materials to terrorist groups?
The New Focus on Vaccine Development
Many of today's
vaccines were first developed and tested in the military. Is this a
good model for future efforts? How does the military perception of
appropriate vaccine use differ from civilian policymakers? The new
national vaccine initiative foresees a major federal role in the
development and purchase of the next generation of vaccines. Who should
manage this ambitious effort? What should be the roles of public health
agencies ad the private sector?
Case Study: swine flu--lessons for mass immunization
In
1976, the CDC mounted a national immunization campaign against a
projected new influenza virus that was feared to be unusually virulent.
However, the virus never arrived. Instead 25 people died from
unexpected side effects from the vaccine itself. What can we learn from
this program about decision making with fragmentary evidence; about
probing medical assumptions; and about accurate public communication?
Learning from SARS/ Avian Flu
The Sars epidemic and the
threat of Avian Flu are striking reminders of how infectious diseases
can spread in unexpected ways. What can we learn from these experiences
about the problems of disease surveillance, accurate diagnosis,
effective treatments, and the detection of novel viruses? How would the
SARS outbreak have been different if it had been a deliberate release?
There will be a reception and dinner for course participants and faculty on Monday night.
All of the faculty have been extensively involved with research and policymaking on public heath and national security issues.
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Jeanne Guillemin is Senior Advisor at the Security Studies Program, at MIT, and Professor of Sociology at Boston College. She is the author of Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, which examined the Soviet release; and Biological Weapons : From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism
(2005). She is now completing a book on biological weapons and national
security. Her current research, supported by the MacArthur Foundation,
is on the anthrax postal attacks of September-October 2001. For more information: http://www2.bc.edu/~guilleje/Homepage%28Frames%29.html |
| Kendall Hoyt is a Fellow at the International Security
Program at Harvard University. She is also an Assistant Professor in
the Department of Medicine at Dartmouth Medical School. She studies
U.S. biodefense policy and R&D strategy. She is currently writing a
book on the history of military-industrial relations in vaccine
innovation and biodefense research. For more information: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/person.cfm?order_by=name&program=CORE&ln=full&item_id=387 |
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Gregory Koblentz is a Post-Doctoral fellow with the Security
Studies Program and an Instructor in the Department of Political
Science at MIT. His research and teaching focuses on terrorism and the
international security implications of biological weapons. He was
previously at the Olin Institute and at the Kennedy School at Harvard.
He has published articles in International Security, Arms Control Today, and Jane’s Intelligence Review. For more information: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/students/gkoblentz/gkoblentz.html |
| Anthony Robbins is in the Department of Family Medicine and
Community Health at Tufts Medical School. Previously he was state
health director in Vermont, and in Colorado; and Director of the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. He is also past
President of the American Public Health Association. One of his main
public health interests is vaccine research and development, and
immunization policy. For more information: http://www.tufts.edu/med/gpph/Faculty/Robbins.htm |
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Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor of Public Policy and
Organization and Director of the Security Studies Program at MIT. He is
the author or editor of many books concerning change in military and
public health agencies, including Science and the Navy, The American Blood Supply, and The Polaris System Development. For more information: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/faculty_sapolsky.html |
| Richard Swensen was most recently the Undersecretary for
Homeland Security within the Executive Office of Public Safety for the
State of Massachusetts, where he coordinated efforts to prevent and
respond to terrorism. Swensen previously served with the FBI for 29
years, including as the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI offices in
Boston and New Orleans. |
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Sanford L. Weiner is a Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies at MIT. He has written about organizational change and innovation in both military and public health agencies, including the CDC's response to emerging diseases. He is now studying incentives for risk assessment and implementation among agencies responsible for biosecurity. |
Hotels located on the east side of the MIT campus, within walking distance of the course location are: The Kendall Hotel, Cambridge Boston Marriott, and Cambridge Center Residence Inn. Hotels within a short cab ride are: Royal Sonesta Hotel, Hyatt Regency Cambridge, and Hotel@MIT. Please see our hotel listings under the link for Hotels at http://professional.mit.edu for more information.
*A limited number of 1/2-tuition scholarships are available to full-time teaching staff (rank of instructor or higher) of other US educational institutions. Written requests for such scholarships should accompany applications for admission.
